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Although it was not the first case in which the Supreme
Court upheld a welfare claim, Goldberg v. Kelly ' is often
thought of as the case that extended the rule of law to the wel-
fare system. In doing so, it repudiated the "right/privilege" dis-
tinction that would confine procedural protections of economic
interests to private law claims.
But Goldberg did not challenge basic assumptions about the
nature of procedural fairness that the legal culture had devel-
oped principally in connection with private law claims. Its con-
ception of fairness focused on claims initiated by individuals for
relief for themselves, and on an adjudicatory process indepen-
dent of and differentiated from the process of general or line
administration. The Court had no occasion in Goldberg to adopt
the perspective of "public law litigation" or "structural" relief
that on occasion led the federal courts to assess and remake the
administrative processes of schools, prisons, and mental health
facilities,2 and it has not applied this perspective to the welfare
system since then. Goldberg imported to the welfare sphere an
untransformed private law vision of procedure.
Goldberg's residual private law perspective has been an im-
portant limitation on its effect on the welfare system and its
beneficiaries. That effect has not been merely negligible or cos-
metic, but it has been erratic and fallen far short of providing
generally reliable guarantees of fair treatment to beneficiaries.
I plan to offer a brief defense of Goldberg's basic rule-of-law
premise against Richard Epstein's critique, and then to sketch
my own critique of the limited way the premise has been
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. Several friends made helpful comments on
an earlier draft; Frank Michelman was especially generous.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. RE. 1281
(1976); 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN. INJUNCTIONS 528-827 (2d ed. 1984).
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implemented.
I. REMEMBERING THE ANSWERS
William Phillips once responded in frustration to a leftist
political disquisition that the argument was so old he had for-
gotten the answer to it.3 In case some liberals have a similar re-
action to Richard Epstein's resurrection of the right/privilege
distinction,4 let me recall one aspect of the answer that is partic-
ularly responsive to his approach.
There are many variations on the rule-of-law principle, but
mogt people would interpret it to denote that the state in its
dealings with citizens should act through rules that are publicly
enacted and general in form." One purpose of the requirements
of publicity and generality is to inhibit legislation that disre-
gards the public interest; a related purpose is to constrain the
acquisition of influence over public power disproportionate to
the allocated legislative voting strength of the would-be
acquirers.
It follows from this premise that there must be effective
means of enforcement of enacted rules. The constraints of pub-
licity and generality would not serve their purposes unless offi-
cial conduct conformed to enacted rules. Additionally, the An-
glo-American legal tradition has insisted that ultimate authority
to enforce the rule of law should reside in courts substantially
independent of the.legislative and executive branches.6 Thus, a
minimal statement of the rule-of-law principle would require
court-supervised publicity and generality plus minimally effec-
tive enforcement procedures. Goldberg did no more than apply
this minimal principle to the welfare system.
Richard Epstein believes statutory welfare rights illegiti-
mate, but he also believes in the rule of law, and he interprets
the due process clauses to express some such principle, rather
than simply to protect what would today be an anachronistic
collection of interests defined by the law in force at the time of
their enactment." It would seem to follow inescapably that the
3N. PODHORETZ, MAKING IT 319 (1967).
Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 747 (1990).
A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188-96 (1968).
8 See id.
7 Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56
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rule-of-law principle applies to the welfare system unless there
were some reason to believe that the abuses it safeguards against
are not serious there. *Since Epstein is usually pessimistic to the
point of paranoia about the motivations of legislators and execu-
tive officials, I would have thought that he would have had to
concede that, given a statutory system of substantive welfare
rights, the rule-of-law applies and entails judicially mandated
minimum enforcement procedures."
To my surprise, however, Epstein has difficulty imagining
reasons .why legislators willing to create substantive welfare
rights should not be trusted to create adequate procedures to
enforce them. Let me suggest a few. They might hope to take
the wind out of the sails of-a movement for welfare rights by
providing them substantively, while tacitly or covertly undercut-
ting or nullifying them with ineffective enforcement. Or they
might want to facilitate tacitly an allocation of benefits for
which they could not win adequate support if provided explic-
itly. Or perhaps the legislature has been "captured" by an en-
trenched public bureaucracy that wants to control the program
in its own interests rather than in those of its putative benefi-
ciaries. The history of American welfare legislation contains
many examples of such abuses."
Epstein's focus on legislative ill will is somewhat mislead-
ing-even though such ill will is surely no harder to find in wel-
fare than in the private rights area. But a more important part
of the problem is the influence of the background distribution of
wealth in undermining the distribution of political rights. The
standard background enforcement procedures provided by the
GEo. WASH. L REv. 149 (1987).
" Given Epstein's stipulation for the purposes of argument of the substantive legiti-
macy of welfaie benefits, I fail to see the relevance of his emphasis on the fact that the
substantive elimination of welfare benefits would not amount to a "taking" requiring
"just compensation." The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the "property"
protected by the takings doctrine is co-extensive with the "property" protected by due
process, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960), and conflating the two would be
entirely alien to the rule-of-law principle.
E.g., W. BELL, Am TO DEPENDENT CHI.DREN (1965) (on the use of administrative
discretion in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program to enforce
illegitimate racist and moralistic administrative practices); D. MoNncom.any, BEvow
EQUALrrY: LABOR AND THE RADicAL REPuBUcANs 1862-1872 296-334 (1967) (on the sub-




legal system are typically more accessible to the relatively
wealthy, well-educated and well-connected. Without procedures
tailored to their circumstances, the disadvantaged are less likely
to enforce their substantive entitlements. The need of the disad-
vantaged to secure special procedural accommodations, while
the advantaged can rely on private resources for enforcement,
means that the disadvantaged must spend greater political re-
sources than the advantaged to achieve a comparable amount of
substantive benefit. Enforceability is not something that the
beneficiaries of substantive laws should have to struggle for each
time a statute is passed; it is a baseline entitlement required by
the rule-of-law principle.
The fact that the vindication of the rule-of-law principle in
the welfare context requires difficult line-drawing or costs money
does not distinguish Goldberg from most other situations in
which courts are responsible for constitutional rights. I am not
happy with where the Court has drawn the line in this area ei-
ther, but I am bewildered at Epstein's suggestion that line-draw-
ing or cost concerns are more severe here than with regard to
procedures to enforce private rights. The standard American
procedure for civil adjudication-widely available for private
rights of all but the most trivial magnitude-is surely the most
expensive such dispute resolution process known to humankind.
Justice Rehnquist, who shares Epstein's concern about the ex-
pense of welfare procedures, expressed a "nagging sense of un-
fairness" a few years ago about the Court's application of collat-
eral estoppel to deny a corporate defendant a second judicial
trial on a fraud defense. 10 Goldberg's lines have a nearly Euclid-
ian rigor compared to many drawn in the private rights context.
Epstein also parades a superstition popularized by Justice
Black and Judge Friendly-the idea that the cost of due process
protection must be financed by reductions in benefits because
the resources available to finance the welfare system are fixed."
This contention strongly resembles the "wage fund" doctrine of
nineteenth century political economy, and its scientific basis is
'0 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
'" Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1303-04 (1975);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
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comparable.12 It would be impossible to show that any of the
many judicial welfare expansions of the 1960s and 1970s came at
the expense of other welfare interests. The size of public assis-
tance expenditures increased enormously during this period in
absolute terms, and it more than doubled as a percentage of
Gross National Product.1 3 It seems likely that, by focusing at-
tention on abusive practices and adding legitimacy to welfare in-
terests, cases like Goldberg contributed to political pressure to
increase the allocation of resources to the system.
Epstein, again seconding Justice Black, suggests that the
procedures mandated by Goldberg, notably the requirement of a
hearing prior to termination, are extravagant and unprece-
dented. He does not like the fact that the state is required to
pay out money it denies is owed pending the hearing, even
though such payments may prove unrecoverable if the state
prevails. But Goldberg simply addressed the problem that courts
have dealt with for centuries of who is going to bear the risk of
loss occasioned by procedural delay, and it proceeded in a way
for which there is ample precedent-by balancing hardships.
4
Most people would probably agree that the fact that the pay-
ments are a matter of subsistence to many claimants alone war-
rants the balance struck. It is also worth considering that, since
the welfare department has substantial control over the extent
of hearing delay, Goldberg allocates .costs to the cheapest cost
avoider, and that Justice Black underestimated the probability
that payments ultimately determined to be mistaken could be
recovered. 5
12 See JOHN STUART MILL, Thornton on Labor and Its Claims, in V COLLECTED
WoaKS 633, 643-46 (J.ML Robson ed. 1967).
13 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ASTRAcr OP TUE
UNrrED STATES 1990 350, 425 (110th ed.) (figures for GNP and "Public Aid" expendi-
tures for, for example, 1960 and 1975 indicating increase of latter as percentage of former
from less than one to more than two percent). See also id. at 352 (indicating increase in
"social welfare" expenditures-including social insurance as well as public assistance-as
a percentage of GNP between 1960 and 1975 from 10.3 to 19 percent).
14 See IV PohmRoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1685 (2d ed. 1919).
15 If the claimant remains eligible or re-establishes eligibility after the hearing, the
welfare department can recoup interim payments by reducing his grant; if the claimant
has wages, the department can garnish them. The AFDC program recently has shown
great enthusiasm for pursuing such remedies. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(13) (1989).
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II. THE PERSISTENCE OF PRIVATE LAW PREMISES
Goldberg recognized that the rule-of-law principle requires
procedures that are practically accessible to the beneficiaries of
the relevant substantive rights. "The opportunity to be heard
must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those
who are to be heard,"'" the Court stated, and it applied this
principle when it held that the hearing must precede the termi-
nation of benefits and that an opportunity for oral as well as
written presentations must be provided.
Yet the Court has not applied this concern for the practical
implementation of fairness ideals in the sphere of line adminis-
tration. Perhaps the most extreme indication of the Court's in-
difference to procedural fairness in line administration is its
1981 decision in Schweiker v. Hansen.1 Hansen represents the
tacit dark side of the Goldberg vision.
The claimant in Hansen had inquired of a field, representa-
tive at her Social Security office as to whether she was eligible
for Social Security "mother's insurance benefits."' 8 The repre-
sentative erroneously told her she was not eligible and, in viola-
tion of applicable instructions, failed to advise her of the advan-
tages of filing an application.' The claimant left without filing
and did so only more than a year later when she learned that she
had been misinformed.20 The Social Security Administration de-
nied her benefits for the period between her first visit and the
application on the basis of a statutory provision making the fil-
ing of an application a condition of eligibility.
2'
The issue was framed by the parties as whether the govern-
ment was "estopped" to deny benefits on the basis of the earlier
failure to apply.22 Putting the matter this way had the unfortu-
nate consequence of invoking one of the Court's more casuistic
bodies of case law-the "government estoppel" doctrine. Yet
even in this otherworldly terrain the Second Circuit had no
trouble concluding that procedural fairness required the award
16 397 U.S. at 268-69.
17 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
11 Id. at 786.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 787.
22 Id.
[Vol. 56:777
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of benefits.2 3 The Supreme Court, however, not only reversed,
but in a rare gesture of contempt for the beneficiary's claims,
did so summarily. The Court concluded that the field represen-
tative's conduct did not warrant estoppel, in part because the
instruction he violated did not amount to a "law.1
24
In discussing whether the field representative's misstate-
ments violated a "law," neither the Court nor the dissent consid-
-ered whether the substantive statutory provisions creating the
"mother's" benefit program should be construed as "instinct
with an obligation" on the part of the government to make rea-
sonable efforts to implement the program.2 5 Most remarkably,
no one considered that, even if the statutes and the estoppel
doctrine created no duty to assist the claimant, constitutional
due process requirements did. No one considered that this case
might be governed by Goldberg.
How would the Court have distinguished Goldberg if the is-
sue had arisen? Perhaps it would have pointed out that
Goldberg did not specify the provision of information about the
law as among the requisites of due process. But it seems undeni-
able that procedural fairness requires some government effort to
make information about the law accessible to citizens,2 and
Goldberg suggests that in the welfare area such efforts should be
"tailored to the circumstances" of their beneficiaries. Without
government-provided information, most beneficiaries could not
begin to claim their rights. The need for officials to provide in-
formation and make other efforts to assist claimants has been
recognized without controversy in the sphere of administrative
adjudication, where hearing officers are reversed for misleading
or failing to assist claimants.27
Thus, one suspects that the critical distinction for the Court
between Goldberg and Hansen would have turned, not on the
duty to provide information, but rather on the distinction be-
" Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
24 450 U.S. at 789-90.
25 Cf. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917) (Cardozo,
J.) (interpreting contract to imply promise to make reasonable efforts to effectuate the
specified enterprise).
" See Societe Internationale pour Participation Industrielles et Commercials, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); L. FULLER, TRE MonAxrry oF LAW 49-51, 63-65, 70-79 (rev.
ed. 1969).
27 E.g., Gold v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir.
1972); Jagow v. Child, 95 Idaho 830, 521 P.2d 654 (1974).
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tween adjudication and administration. Goldberg requires an ad-
equate system of adjudicatory review, but does not directly af-
fect the underlying administrative process.
28
Goldberg should be assessed in the light of the qualification
exemplified by Hansen. The two cases represent well the dis-
tinct spheres of adjudicatory and line administration that have
emerged in the past twenty years. On the one hand, there is the
realm of procedural fairness prescribed by Goldberg-a hearing
system in which the claimant can participate, actively confront
adverse witnesses, and speak directly to a decision maker with
the authority and responsibility to determine her claims. Typi-
cally the decision maker will have some of the latitude of a com-
mon law judge to make decisions based on purposive under-
standings of the rules and to entertain claims based on implicit
or unformulated norms. Many states have recruited lawyer deci-
sion makers and even provided them with the status of "admin-
istrative law judges" with exceptional civil service safeguards of
autonomy.
Then there is the realm of Hansen-a line bureaucracy of
personnel regulated by minutely specified rules and uniquely
and pervasively accountable to hierarchical authority.2 As the
hearing system has become more professionalized, the adminis-
28 The Hansen opinion supports its application of the estoppel doctrine with a point
about the practical effect on the government of recognizing estoppel claims:
If Connelly's minor breach of. . . a manual suffices to estop petitioner, then
the Government is put "at risk that every alleged failure by an agent to follow
instructions to the last detail in one of a thousand cases will deprive it of the
benefit of the written application requirement which experience has taught to
be essential to the honest and effective administration of the Social Security
Laws."
450 U.S. at 789-90 (quoting Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 956 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly,
J., dissenting)).
The argument is contrary to the spirit of Goldberg in the contempt for the claimant
implied in its characterization of an official wrong that has deprived a widow of a year's
income as "minor" and in its refusal to balance the government interest in requiring
timely written applications in these circumstances with the resulting harm to benefi-
ciaries. It also ignores that private insurers, which handle a far larger volume of claims
than the social insurance system, have operated for decades under legal regimes that
impose the obligations the Court associated with "estoppel," and in some states, consid-
erably stricter ones. See, e.g., Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 123 Ariz. 529, 647
P.2d 1127, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ellinghouse, 223 Mont,
239, 725 P.2d 217 (1986).
29 See Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1
(1986); Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J,
1198 (1983) [hereinafter Legality, Bureaucracy].
[Vol. 56: 777
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trative system has been proletarianized. The old ideal of
frontline administration by professional social workers has been
discarded, and the small but influential number of social work-
ers in the system at the time of Goldberg have been expelled.
The frontline administrative job has been redesigned as a cleri-
cal one, and educational qualifications have been lowered. The
system is now staffed by people who lack both the power and
the aspiration to assist claimants.
The two systems are radically segregated. Most states have
carried Goldberg's prescription of an "independent" decision
maker much farther than the case required. The hearing officers
belong to separate administrative units with separate supervi-
sory hierarchies that-merge with the line administrative hierar-
chies only at the very top of the system. In some systems,
frontline workers do not participate at all in hearings involving
their decisions; full-time staff representatives do this work. Even
where they do participate, line workers are taught that what
happens in the hearing system should not influence their routine
administrative work; in particular, they are not to regard a re-
versal at hearing as precedent to apply in like cases that arise in
their routine administrative work. The personnel and quality
control systems that evaluate administrative decisions involve
distinct personnel and criteria from the Goldberg hearing sys-
tem. What constitutes error for the purposes of recipient-initi-
ated Goldberg hearing review may be quite different from what
constitutes error for quality control or personnel purposes.
A claimant who enters the hearing system has a good
chance of being treated with the respect and thoughtful atten-
tion contemplated by Goldberg. And he has a good chance of
getting tangible relief; reversal rates at hearing in most programs
are substantial.30 Thus, it might be argued, as Goldberg appar-
ently assumed, that the hearing system serves as an adequate
check on the line administrative system. But there are problems
with this contention.
First, as Hansen illustrates, not all bad administrative deci-
10 For example, in AFDC in fiscal year 1988, more than two-thirds of the claims
determined by hearing decision (about one-third of total claims filed) were decided in
favor of the claimant; about twenty percent of claims withdrawn before hearing (two-
thirds of total filings) were settled on terms involving relief to claimants. US. DEP'T ov




sions-decisions that would be reversed on appeal-actually are
appealed. In order to pursue an appeal, a claimant needs either
professional assistance or the information to identify that she
has a claim as well as the ability to negotiate the appellate pro-
cedures and articulate her claim. Goldberg recognized that, in
fact, beneficiaries often lack such resources.
Moreover, the administrative changes that have accompa-
nied the emergence of the hearing system severely threaten ben-
eficiary interests. At worst, they encourage denials of benefits to
eligible beneficiaries. For example, personnel and quality control
systems often impose substantial penalties for improper assis-
tance but lesser or no penalties for improper failures to assist.
More generally, the tendency of administrative change has been
to reduce the availability of administrative advice and assistance
to claimants at the same time as to increase claimants' need for
them by making the process of establishing and maintaining eli-
gibility more complex.3'
We do not know the magnitude of erroneous denials of ben-
efits that do not make it into the hearing system, but it seems
likely to be very large. While reversal rates in welfare hearings
are generally substantial, appeal rates tend to be small. For ex-
ample, in AFDC on average only about one to two percent of
application denials and benefit terminations are appealed.32
Even in the few programs and localities where appeal rates are
high, reversal rates typically remain high. My impression is that
high appeal rates correlate most strongly with the availability of
advice and assistance outside the system rather than with the
incidence of errors harmful to claimants.
Second, some eligible beneficiaries do not even make it into
the administrative sphere because they lack the information or
resources needed to file an application. The participation rate in
AFDC has reached high levels in the years since Goldberg, but
in other programs, such as Supplemental Security Income, the
major cash assistance program for the indigent aged and dis-
abled, it remains low.3 3 Participation rates are functions of the
31 See Legality, Bureaucracy, supra note 29; Casey & Mannix, Quality Control in
Public Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-sided Accountability, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381 (1989).
31 Estimated from data in Department of Health and Human Services, cited at note
30, at 93, 104.
33 See Menefee, Edwards & Brown, Analysis of Nonparticipation in the SSI Pro-
[Vol. 56: 777
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extent to which the system makes "outreach" efforts to provide
information and assistance in the application process. Clearly,
the hearing system is no remedy for deficiencies in outreach.
Third, if, as many have concluded, Goldberg is concerned
not only with accurate decision making, but with the dignity of
welfare beneficiaries, then the application of due process norms
only through the hearing system has a further failing. This ap-
proach is unresponsive to the sense of oppression and degrada-
tion that the bureaucratized system engenders, as well as to the
often gratuitous practical burdens of bureaucratic paper pushing
and hoop jumping that the system imposes.
This experience is in part a function of the design of the
line worker's job, which focuses her attention on policing the
claimant's satisfaction of a gauntlet of often meaningless bu-
reaucratic tasks and leaves her powerless either to respond to
contingencies of need that escape the rigid eligibility categories
or to mitigate the irrationality of the procedural requirements.
In places like New York City, where appeal rates are high, the
hearing system seems to have the perverse effect of reducing
pressure for general administrative reform and helping workers
and administrators rationalize irresponsible behavior. Rather
than correcting errors or trying to get their superiors to do so,
the workers tell the beneficiaries to take their claims to
hearing.
34
At its best, the hearing system provides the beneficiary with
the individualized, respectful attention contemplated by those
who interpret Goldberg as an expression of "dignitary" or "pro-
cess" values. But most beneficiaries never reach the hearing
sphere and those who do reach it only rarely and briefly. The
setting in which beneficiaries typically confront the welfare state
is the line administrative one, and here their experience remains
one of arbitrariness and indifference.
Obviously a contrary ruling in Hansen would not have been
substantially responsive to any of these deficiencies. An estoppel
remedy would only benefit people who ultimately secured access
to information and resources to bring a claim to hearing. I focus
gram, Soc. SECURmT Bum (June 1981); Bendick, Failure to Enroll in Public Assistance
Programs, 25 Soc. WoRK 268 (1980).
3" See Barbanel, Problems in New York's Welfare System: Judging an Agencys
Mistakes and Decisions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1988, at B1, col 2.
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on Hansen as an expression of the Court's general unwillingness
to apply due process directly to line administration. Were the
Court willing to apply due process more broadly, the most plau-
sible approach would be through structural injunctive relief
mandating reforms in the administrative process.3 6 The federal
courts have been backing away from structural relief in the areas
in which it was pioneered for reasons that seem to have less to
do with the practical success of prior experiments and more with
the dogmatic reassertion of private law notions of entitlement.30
But in welfare, structural relief never even got off the ground.
As long as the Goldberg doctrine means the enforcement of
due process only through the hearing system, it must be re-
garded as at best a partial victory for procedural fairness in the
welfare system.
31 Mashaw, The Management of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation
Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
" See Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term: Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HA~v. L. REv. 4 (1982).
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